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Abstract
Compared to organizations in other sectors, civil society orga-
nizations (CSOs) are particularly vulnerable to security and
privacy threats, as they lack adequate resources and exper-
tise to defend themselves. At the same time, their security
needs and practices have not gained much attention among
researchers, and existing solutions designed for the average
users do not consider the contexts in which CSO employees
operate. As part of our preliminary work, we conducted an
anonymous online survey with 102 CSO employees to collect
information about their perceived risks of different security
and privacy threats, and their self-reported mitigation strate-
gies. The design of our preliminary survey accounted for the
unique requirements of our target population by establishing
trust with respondents, using anonymity-preserving incentive
strategies, and distributing the survey with the help of a trusted
intermediary. However, by carefully examining our methods
and the feedback received from respondents, we uncovered
several issues with our methodology, including the length of
the survey, the framing of the questions, and the design of the
recruitment email. We hope that the discussion presented in
this paper will inform and assist researchers and practitioners
working on understanding and improving the security and
privacy of CSOs.
1 Introduction
Researchers and practitioners have traditionally focused on
the security needs and practices of the average users, sidestep-
ping underrepresented and vulnerable communities. In recent
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years, there has been an increase in research examining the
security and privacy behaviors of such groups, revealing nu-
anced and community-specific concerns and practices that
differ from those of the average users [4, 5, 18, 26, 28, 34].
One such vulnerable online population consists of employ-
ees working for civil society organizations (CSOs), which
include a wide range of groups, such as humanitarian organi-
zations, labor unions, advocacy groups, indigenous peoples
movements, faith-based organizations, community groups,
professional associations, foundations, think tanks, charita-
ble organizations, and other non-governmental and not-for-
profit organizations [17]. Compared to other sectors, civil
society operates in elevated-risk contexts, as they are often
targeted for political or ideological reasons by state-sponsored
actors [22], political opponents [32], hate groups [6], and rad-
icalized individuals [13]. Whereas attacks against average
users and for-profit organizations mostly result in financial
losses [3], attacks against individuals working for politically-
vulnerable CSOs often carry greater ramifications, including,
in severe cases, threats to freedom of expression, liberty, and
even life [9, 10, 23, 25].
Prior research indicates that civil society groups lack the
funds and human resources to defend themselves against secu-
rity and privacy threats [7]. For instance, they maintain a low
ratio of IT staff to non-technical staff [19], do not conduct vul-
nerability assessments [1], and do not adopt solutions aimed
at improving their cybersecurity [33]. Findings from a 2018
report by the Public Interest Registry [2] indicate that CSOs
rarely have access to purpose-built systems and instead, tend
to use commodity tools that are not tailored to their needs and
elevated risk profiles. For instance, 58% of surveyed CSOs
use Facebook messenger, which is not encrypted by default,
to communicate sensitive information [2]. Although recent
attempts have been made to design security solutions that are
tailored specifically to CSOs [14, 21], they often fail to cap-
ture the needs, practices, and mental models of their intended
users [24, 27].
In November and December of 2019, we conducted an
anonymous online survey with 102 CSO employees to collect
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information about their risk perceptions and self-reported mit-
igation strategies. We surveyed employees at a broad range
of organizations based in the US, some of which could be
classified as high-risk and others as low-risk, in order to com-
pare their average perceived risks. The survey also measured
several other factors that we believe affect the attitudes and
intentions of individuals to engage in protective behavior (e.g.
risk awareness, self-efficacy, perceived support, etc). We also
collected organizational and demographic information. Fi-
nally, we asked the participants to provide us feedback at the
end of the survey to help us improve future iterations of the
study.
In the rest of this article, we discuss the motivation for
our work, the methodology for the preliminary study, the
challenges we faced, and the lessons we learned from our
experience and the respondents’ feedback. We hope that this
discussion will also benefit other researchers and practitioners
working in this area.
2 Motivation
One could try to dismiss cyberattacks against civil society
and elevated-risk users as “edge cases” that deserve less at-
tention than more sophisticated technical attacks, or threats
that affect broader user populations. However, there are sev-
eral reasons why understanding the context in which CSOs
operate is essential. First, employees working for CSOs con-
stitute a sizable proportion of the population. In the US alone,
they account for 11.4 million jobs or 10.3% of the non-public
sector workforce [8]. Second, as most CSOs employ standard
tools used by millions of users [2], while their online risks
are amplified compared to the general population [7], this par-
ticularly vulnerable population could be considered “extreme
users” [12]. Therefore, understanding how CSO employees
use mainstream tools could reveal insights on usability and
security issues that might be overlooked in the studies with
typical user communities. Such insights will help to improve
the design of technology for the average use-case as well.
For instance, enabling key security choices by default in pop-
ular platforms would improve the security outcomes both
for the high-risk and the average users. Finally, cyberattacks
that target CSOs today are precursors of threats that could
affect broader user groups tomorrow [31]. Understanding how
to protect against such threats for the high-risk users would,
therefore, also confer security for the average users.
3 Methodology
The goal of our study is to better understand cybersecurity
concerns and practices in CSOs to improve their resilience
against cybersecurity attacks. Based on our personal experi-
ence working with CSOs and prior work with journalists [28],
activists [24], and humanitarian workers [20], we identified
the following seven threats: phishing, malware, online harass-
ment, online reputation attack, physical device compromise,
surveillance, and attacks on online services. We designed and
executed a survey among employees at CSOs to assess the re-
spondents’ risk perceptions of each of these seven threats and
to collect information on their self-reported risk mitigation
strategies for one specific threat chosen at random. Addition-
ally, the survey presented a list of strategies that correspond to
best practices in mitigating each threat and asked participants
to report their level of familiarity with each and whether they
have made use of them.1
In addition to following standard questionnaire design
guidelines, such as designing scales to measure the constructs,
minimizing survey response time, and protecting the confi-
dentiality of responses, we addressed several considerations
that were specific to employees at CSOs: establishing trust,
preserving anonymity, and recruitment challenges.
Establishing trust. While communicating research risks
is essential in any study that involves human subjects, it is
especially important when surveying vulnerable populations.
More specifically, revealing information about the current
security practices and priorities of a CSO could place their
employees and the organization as a whole at heightened risk.
While our survey was completely anonymous and did not
collect identifiers of any kind, we also had to ensure that our
respondents felt safe enough to provide information related
to our research goals. In addition to communicating our com-
mitment to anonymization in the consent form, we separately
highlighted the anonymity of the survey in a separate location
in the survey itself, in order to establish trust with respondents
and to relieve their concerns. This also increased the chance
that respondents were aware of the safeguards employed, even
if some of them did not read the consent form entirely.
Using anonymity-preserving incentive strategies. We
wanted to provide some incentives to respondents as a com-
pensation for their time, and to increase participation rates
in the survey. As we are not assigning any identifiers to the
survey participants, we cannot follow-up with them to pro-
vide any direct compensation. Instead, at the end of the survey
respondents can select one of three charities, to which we will
proportionally donate our compensation budget at the end of
the study. Research has shown that material incentives (ei-
ther monetary or non-monetary) [15] and sharing result sum-
maries [11] increase response and completion rates for online
surveys, but without affecting the quality of responses [16,30].
Using a trusted intermediary for participant recruit-
ment. In order to reach our target population, we partnered
with TechSoup, a nonprofit that coordinates an international
network of other nonprofits, providing technical support, train-
ing, and tools.2 We distributed our survey in one of Tech-
1These mitigation strategies were compiled from various online resources
that provide security and privacy guidelines for individuals and organizations,
which were then reviewed by our research team.
2https://www.techsoup.org/
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Figure 1: Recruitment banner included in the email newsletter.
Soup’s periodic newsletters, which allowed us to leverage
their large reach among nonprofits and their existing connec-
tion to our target audience. The survey was promoted via a
banner ad (see Figure 1), which included an anonymous link to
our survey. The content and format of the banner had to accom-
modate the existing conventions established in TechSoup’s
newsletters. Recruitment text with a stronger call-to-action
may have attracted more attention, but this compromise was
well worth it to directly access our target population. Addi-
tionally, we are able to disseminate key findings back through
TechSoup’s platform so that participants who participated
anonymously can review and learn from the results of the
study.
4 Challenges
Previous surveys run by TechSoup among their network
achieved from 2,500 to 20,000 responses, and we were opti-
mistic that we would see at least several thousand participants
respond to our survey. Unfortunately, only 160 individuals
navigated to the survey in the first place; 16 potential par-
ticipants were excluded because they never progressed past
the consent form, 39 participants were excluded because they
did not finish the survey, and 3 respondents were addition-
ally excluded due to incorrect responses to attention check
questions, leaving 102 complete responses that we analyzed.
After analyzing the valid responses and the feedback from
respondents, we identified several issues that we intend to ad-
dress in the next iteration of the survey, including the survey
length, incorrect terminology, non-applicable questions, and
the design of the banner ad.
Length of the survey. By far the most common feedback
that we have received was that the survey was too long and/or
contained repetitive questions (mentioned by 41% of respon-
dents who provided feedback). To assess key factors that
affect the attitudes and intentions of participants to engage in
protective behavior, we included a total of 11 scales developed
to measure constructs such as risk awareness, self-efficacy,
response efficacy, perceived support, perceived culture, and
others, each ranging from 2 to 7 items each. This also resulted
in a 19.8 minutes median completion time, which is longer
than the recommended 10 minutes for online surveys [29].
To address this challenge, we suggest narrowing down the
scope of research questions to reduce the number of con-
structs measured by the survey, or to use the between-subject
approach, i.e. present only a subset of questions to each par-
ticipant if the expected sample size is large. We also suggest
providing feedback to respondents as they are completing the
survey, for instance, by displaying their current progress in
the survey and explaining that although questions might seem
repetitious, they are in fact measuring different factors.
Incorrect terminology. Another issue that we discovered
was the usage of the word ‘employee’ throughout the sur-
vey to refer to the participant. In the beginning of the survey,
we clarify that we make no distinction between different ca-
pacities of involvement with the organization, and use the
word ‘employee’ only for brevity. Nevertheless, 12% of re-
spondents who provided feedback mentioned that they felt
confused when responding to questions as their organization
has no or few employees, and is composed mostly of volun-
teers.
To avoid this issue, it is important to remember the fact that
individuals engage with CSOs in different capacities, includ-
ing employees, contractors, and volunteers. When referring to
the respondent directly, one approach to solving this problem
is to use neutral phrasing to encompass anyone working at a
CSO (e.g. “as someone working for a civil society organiza-
tion, consider the following. . . ”). For questions that involve
the organization itself, we recommend exhaustively listing
different options to avoid any confusion (e.g. “How many in-
dividuals (including employees, volunteers, contractors, etc.)
currently work for your organization?”).
Non-applicable questions. Our aim was to survey a broad
range of CSOs, regardless of the cause they support, their
position in the industry, or their size, which meant that some
questions had to be broad enough to cover all types of or-
ganizations. For this reason, however, 17% of respondents
who provided feedback mentioned that they were not able to
answer some of the questions as they were not applicable to
them. For instance, some respondents mentioned that their or-
ganization was too small to have information security policies,
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or that they do not report to the IT department because they
are the IT department. For our single- and multiple-choice
questions, we only included a ‘Don’t Know’ option and, thus,
failed to account for questions that do not apply to certain
respondents.
To address this problem, we recommend including a ‘Not
Applicable’ option for each question, alongside an optional
free-text box that can be used to provide additional comments
and clarifications.
Recruitment banner design. We also identified an issue
with the recruitment banner included in TechSoup’s email
newsletter, as shown in Figure 1. Some members of our re-
search team who had access to the body of the email reported
that it was not clear whether the banner had to be clicked to
navigate to the survey, and others reported it resembling an
advertisement banner that would be ignored. We did not have
much control over the design recruitment banner, as it fol-
lowed TechSoup’s design guidelines, but we believe it might
have contributed to non-response bias, especially if it dispro-
portionately affected those who did not understand that the
banner was clickable or those who assumed that the banner
was simply an advertisement and ignored it.
To increase the number of prospective respondents, we
recommend highlighting the fact that the banner is clickable,
either by including a textual explanation (e.g. “Click here to
participate”), or a graphic that looks like a clickable button
on the banner. We also suggest including supporting text in
the body of the email newsletter that brings attention to the
survey, emphasizes that the survey is for academic and not
commercial reasons, sets expectations about the required time
commitment, and highlights any compensation offered for
participation.
5 Conclusion
We applied survey-based methods to understand cybersecu-
rity concerns and practices of CSO employees, including their
perceived risks of different security and privacy threats, and
their self-reported mitigation strategies. The design of our pre-
liminary survey accounted for the unique requirements of our
target population by establishing trust with respondents, using
anonymity-preserving incentive strategies, and distributing
the survey with the help of TechSoup. However, by carefully
examining our methods and the feedback received from re-
spondents, we uncovered several issues with our methodology,
including the length of the survey, our usage of terminology,
non-applicable questions, and the design of the recruitment
banner. We hope that the discussion of these challenges will
not only assist us in the design of our future studies but will
also benefit other researchers and practitioners working on un-
derstanding and improving the security and privacy of CSOs.
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